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In 1931, President Herbert Hoover ordered J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, to investigate an organization called the Navy League after the League
publicly criticized the President's spending plan. As part of the
investigation of the League and its members, the FBI accessed
the members' income tax records at the then-named Internal
Revenue Bureau. Although no damaging information was uncovered about the League, this investigation set a precedent of
using tax returns and return information as a weapon against
political enemies. Nearly every administration through the late
1970s followed this precedent.'
Such governmental use of tax records, however, was legal
until January 1, 1977. Prior to this date, tax returns were public
records open to inspection by order of the President and under
rules and regulations prescribed by the Treasury Secretary or his
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1 DAVID BURNAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: POWER,
(1989).

POLITICS, AND THE

IRS 226-28

2 Prior to amendment by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Internal Revenue Code

§ 6103(a) read as follows:
(a) Public record and inspection.
(1) Returns made with respect to taxes imposed by chapters 1, 2,
3 and 6 upon which the tax has been determined by the Secretary or
his delegate shall constitute public records; but, except as hereinafter
provided in this section, they shall be open to inspection only upon
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form Act of 1976, Congress removed tax returns and return information from the realm of public documents.3 Congress also
provided criminal and civil sanctions for the unauthorized disclosure of tax returns and return information.4
This Article explores the issues surrounding the unauthorized disclosure of tax returns and return information, including a
taxpayer's civil remedy under Internal Revenue Code (Code) section 7431. This Article first discusses the history of the amendment of section 6103, the enactment of sections 7217 and 7431,

the reasons Congress deemed action to be necessary, as well as
the specific operative provisions of section 6103. Next, this Article examines section 7431 actions in the federal courts. Finally,
this Article assesses the effectiveness of sections 6103 and 7431
and offers suggestions for their improvement.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1976, taxpayers were afforded minimal protection from the release of return information. Income tax returns were considered public
records, but were generally open to inspection only upon order

of the President and pursuant to Treasury rules approved by the
President.5 Through executive order, specific statutory provisions and regulations, however, dissemination of tax returns and
return information became widespread. Nearly every federal
agency enjoyed some degree of access to tax returns or return
order of the President and under rules and regulations prescribed by

the Secretary or his delegate and approved by the President.
(2) All returns made with respect to the taxes imposed by chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 11, 12 and 32, subchapters B and C of chapter 33,
subchapter B of chapter 37, and chapter 41, shall constitute public
records and shall be open to public examination and inspection to
such extent as shall be authorized in rules and regulations promulgated by the President.
(3) Whenever a return is open to the inspection of any person, a
certified copy thereof shall, upon request, be furnished to such person
under rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate. The Secretary or his delegate may prescribe a reasonable fee for
furnishing such copy.
I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1970) (amended 1976). The text of this Article refers to the 1970
version of I.R.C. § 6103(a) as "old I.R.C. § 6103(a)."
3 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202(a), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
4 I.R.C. §§ 7213, 7217 (1988), amended and added by Pub. L. No. 94-455,
§ 1202(d) and (e), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976). Internal Revenue Code § 7217 was later
amended and redesignated I.R.C. § 7431 by Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 357(b)(1), 96
Stat. 645 (1982).
5 I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1970) (amended 1976).
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information. Return information was also available to congressional committees, the White House staff, the Justice Department, state and local governments and to individuals with a
material interest in specific return information. 6 Federal and
state employees who violated the disclosure limitations of old
section 6103 were subject to a misdemeanor conviction, which
carried a maximum fine of $1000 and/or imprisonment of up to
one year.7
Congress reacted to the controversy surrounding past tax information disclosures to the White House and other federal and
state agencies by determining, in the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
that tax returns and return information should be treated as confidential and subject to disclosure only when authorized by statute.8 As a result, former section 6103 was amended.9 Effective
January 1, 1977, tax returns and return information became confidential and not subject to disclosure unless authorized by Congress.' o Congress authorized disclosure of tax returns and/or
return information under thirteen circumstances:
1. To a designee of the taxpayer upon the taxpayer's written
request or consent;'1
2. to a designated representative of any state agency, body or
commission charged with the administration of state tax
laws,
2
upon the written request of the head of such agency;' 3
3. to persons having a material interest in the return;'
6 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL
ExPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF
7 I.R.C. § 7213(a)(1), (2) (1975).

1976, 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) at 325-36.

8 Among the specific abuses enumerated by Congress were the use of tax return information by the White House for non-tax matters, use by the Justice Department and United States Attorney offices in both tax and non-tax civil and
criminal proceedings to impeach witnesses or discredit their testimony, and the lack
of adequate safeguards over the access to and improper use of such information at
the state and local levels. STAFF OFJOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX., 94TH CONG., 2D
SESS., GENERAL ExPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, 1976-3 C.B. (Vol.
2) at 326-27.
9 Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202(a), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
10 I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1992).
11 Id. § 6103(c).
12 Id. § 6103(d). The designated representative must be an employee or legal
representative (excluding the state's chief executive officer) of the state agency requesting the disclosure. In addition, the Secretary of the Treasury may refuse to
disclose the requested tax returns or tax return information "to the extent that the
Secretary determines that such disclosure would identify a confidential informant
or seriously impair any civil or criminal tax investigation." Id.
13 Id. § 6103(e). Examples of persons having a material interest in a return include a partner in a partnership with respect to the partnership return and a bona
fide one percent or more shareholder of record with respect to a corporate return.
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4. to congressional committees;
5. to the President and certain other persons;
6. to officers and employees of the Treasury and
Justice De6
partments for purposes of tax administration;1
7. to federal officers or employees for the administration of

Id. § 6103(e)(1)(C), (D)(iii). In addition, § 6103(e) lists approximately 20 other situations in which a person will be considered to possess sufficient material interest
in a return to warrant disclosure to that person. Id. § 6103(e).
14 Id. § 6103(o. The Code specifically authorizes disclosure to the House Committee on Ways and Means, the Senate Finance Committee, the Joint Committee on
Taxation and the Chief of Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation and their designees. Id. The information disclosed under § 6103(f) may not be of such a nature
that a particular taxpayer could be directly or indirectly identified unless the taxpayer consents in writing to the disclosure or the information is to be furnished
only when the committee in question is sitting in closed executive session. Id.
§ 6103(f)(1), (2). Other committees of Congress are authorized to inspect returns
or return information only when a specific congressional resolution calls for the
disclosure. Id. § 6103(f)(3).
6
15 Id. § 103(g). The President or his designee (limited to White House office
employees with an annual rate of pay at least equal to that of positions subject to 5
U.S.C. § 5316 (1988)) may inspect return or return information for any person only
upon the President's specific written request, which must include the taxpayer's
name and address, the type of return, the tax years covered in the request and the
reason for the requested disclosure. Id. § 6 10 3(g)(1), (4). In addition, the President or the head of a federal agency may request the disclosure of tax return information regarding an individual designated as under consideration for appointment
to an executive or judicial position in the federal government. Id. § 6103(g)(2).
These disclosures are limited to the following information: whether the individual
has filed returns for the immediately preceding three years; whether the individual
has not paid any tax within 10 days of notice and demand for the current and the
immediately preceding three years; whether the individual is or has been under
criminal tax investigation; and, whether the individual has ever been assessed a civil
tax fraud penalty. Id. Any employee who is designated by the President or the
head of a federal agency to receive the disclosure of tax returns or tax return information is specifically forbidden from disclosing the information to anyone other
than the President or the agency head without a specific written directive from the
President or agency head who requested the disclosure. Id. § 6103(g)(3).
16 Id. § 6103(h). Treasury Department officers and employees whose official duties require the inspection and disclosure of tax returns and tax return information
may gain such access without written request. Id. § 6103(h)(1). Justice department
officers and employees are permitted access to tax returns and tax information only
when they are directly and personally involved in a proceeding before a court or
federal grand jury, or an investigation that may lead to such a proceeding. Id.
§ 6103(h)(2). In addition, § 6103 requires that the taxpayer must or may be a party
to the proceeding or investigation or that an issue in the proceeding or investigation may be or will be related to the return or return information requested. Id. In
addition, an attorney from the Department ofJustice or a party to a proceeding in
which the United States is a party may in writing ask whether a prospective juror
has been audited or otherwise investigated by the IRS; the response is limited to a
yes or no answer. Id. § 6103(h)(5). Tax returns or tax return information may also
be disclosed in a judicial or administrative proceeding if the taxpayer is a party to
such proceeding or the proceeding arose from the taxpayer's tax liability, or if the
consideration of an item on the return relates directly to resolving of an issue in the
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non-tax laws;'
8. to federal officers and employees for statistical use;' 8
9. to certain persons for tax administration purposes; 9
proceeding or the court so orders pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1988) or Rule 16
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. § 6103(h)(4).
17 I.R.C. § 6103(i). Upon a proper application, a federal district court or magistrate judge may order that tax returns or tax return information be disclosed to, or
open to inspection by, officers or employees of any federal agency who are directly
and personally engaged in a federal grand jury proceeding, an investigation that
may lead to such a proceeding or the preparation for any administrative or judicial
proceeding to enforce a specific federal criminal statute to which the United States
is or may be a party. Id. § 6103(i)(1)(A). Before issuing the order, the judge must
determine that:
[T]here is reasonable cause to believe, based upon information believed to be reliable, that a specific criminal act has been committed,
there is reasonable cause to believe that the return or return information is or may be relevant to a matter relating to the commission of
such act, and the return or return information is sought exclusively
for use in a Federal criminal investigation or proceeding concerning
such act, and the information sought to be disclosed cannot reasonably be obtained, under the circumstances, from another source.
Id. § 6103(i)(1)(B). A court order may also be obtained to disclose to the appropriate federal agency officers or employees returns or return information to aid in
locating an individual who is the subject of a federal felony arrest warrant. Id.
§ 6103(i)(5).
Furthermore, disclosure of return information that was not filed by or on the
behalf of the taxpayer (including taxpayer identification) may be disclosed to federal agency officers and employees upon a proper application to the Secretary for
the purposes of a federal criminal investigation, a federal grand jury proceeding or
preparation for a federal judicial or administrative criminal proceeding. Id.

§ 6103(i)(2).
Disclosure of the tax returns or tax return information obtained for the purposes of enforcing the federal criminal laws will be permitted in any judicial or
administrative proceeding to which the United States is a party to the extent necessary to establish a party's guilt or liability. Id. § 6103(i)(4). The Secretary, on his
own volition, may disclose return information to appropriate officers and employees of any federal or state law enforcement agency if the disclosure advises the
disclosees of "an imminent danger of death or physical injury to any individual
....
Id. § 6103(i)(3)(B).
.
Additionally, the Secretary may disclose return information not filed by or on the taxpayer's behalf to the head of the appropriate federal
agency if the disclosed information may constitute evidence of the commission of a
federal crime. Id. § 6103(i)(3)(A).
18 Id. § 6103(j). The Code sanctions disclosure to the Bureaus of Census and
Economic Analysis within the Department of Commerce, the Division of Financial
Statistics of the Bureau of Economics within the Federal Trade Commission (corporate returns only) and the Department of Treasury for the preparation of statistical analysis. Id.
19 Id. § 6103(k). Return information relating to accepted offers-in-compromise
must be disclosed to the general public to comply with the public disclosure requirements of § 7122. Id. § 6103(k)(1). The amount of an outstanding obligation
secured by a tax lien may be disclosed to any person supplying sufficient written
evidence that he has obtained, or intends to secure, a right in the property. Id.
§ 6103(k)(2). If a previous disclosure concerning a taxpayer contained a misstatement of fact, the Secretary may, with the approval of the Joint Committee on Taxa-
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other
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tax

tion, make an additional disclosure to the extent necessary to correct the previous
misstatement. Id. § 6103(k)(3). Disclosures may also be made to competent authorities of foreign governments pursuant to a convention or a bilateral agreement
with the United States regarding the exchange of tax information, to the head of
state agencies charged with the regulation of tax preparers and to the extent necessary to administer the excise tax provisions. Id. § 6103(k)(4), (5), (7). The Code
also authorizes disclosures of return information to the extent necessary in obtaining information not otherwise reasonably available in connection with an IRS
employee's official duty relating to any audit, civil or criminal tax investigation, collection activity or any other violation of the internal revenue laws. The Treasury
Regulation promulgated under § 6103 establishes seven situations in which such a
disclosure is warranted:
(1) To establish or verify the correctness or completeness of any return . . .; (2) To determine the responsibility for filing a return, for
making a return where none has been made ... ; (3) To establish or
verify the liability (or possible liability) of any person . . . for any tax,

penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or any other imposition or offense
under the internal revenue laws or the amount thereof to be collected;
(4) To establish or verify misconduct (or possible misconduct) or
other activity proscribed by the internal revenue laws; (5) To obtain
the services of persons having special knowledge or technical skills...
; (6) To establish or verify the financial status or condition and location of the taxpayer against whom collection is or may be directed [or]
to locate assets in which the taxpayer has an interest .

.

. ; or (7) To

prepare for any proceeding [before a federal grand jury or a federal
or state court].
Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-l(b)(l) to (7) (1990).
20 I.R.C. § 6103(). Upon written request, the Secretary may disclose returns
and return information to the Social Security Administration, the Railroad Retirement Board and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation for the administration
of the congressional acts governing those agencies. Id. § 6103()(1), (2). Information concerning whether an applicant for certain federal loans possesses a delinquent tax account may be disclosed to the head of the federal agency administering
the loan program. Id. § 6103(l)(3). The Code also authorizes the Treasury Secretary to disclose certain return information upon written request from the Secretary
of Health and Human Services in accordance with an agreement entered pursuant
to § 232 of the Social Security Act. Id. § 6103(l)(5). Upon written request from the
appropriate federal, state or local child support enforcement agency, the Secretary
may disclose return information to the extent necessary to establish and collect
child support obligations or to locate individuals owing child support. Id.
§ 6103(t)(6). Other permissible disclosures under this subsection include: return
information concerning unearned income to federal, state or local agencies administering certain entitlement programs, id. § 6103(l)(7), (12); returns and return
information to employees or former employees of the Department of Treasury, as
well as Department of Treasury officers or employees who are representing the
United States, who are or may be a party to an administrative action or proceeding
that may affect their personnel rights, id. § 6103(/)(4); and, certain return information to officers and employees of any agency seeking a reduction of an overpayment
under Code § 6402(c) (offsets for past due child support) and § 6402(d) (offsets for
past due legally enforceable debts to federal agencies). Id. § 6103(/)(10). The return information disclosable under this last provision relates to whether the offset
was made, the amount of the offset, whether the taxpayer filed a joint return and
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for limited purposes; 21
11. taxpayer identity information
22
12. to certain other persons;
23
13. to certain other persons with respect to certain taxes;
Congress also decided that prior provisions of the Code dealing
with the enforcement of rules against improper use or disclosure of
returns and return information were inadequate. 2 4 As a result, the
criminal provisions of Code section 7213 were increased from a misdemeanor (imprisonment of up to one year and/or a fine up to
$1000) to a felony (imprisonment of up to five years and/or a fine
up to $5,000).25 Congress, in broadening the section's scope, decreed that the criminal sanctions are enforceable not only against
whether a payment was made to the spouse of the taxpayer, against whom the offset
was requested, on the basis of a joint return. Id.
21 Id. § 6103(m). The Secretary may disclose a taxpayer's mailing address upon
written request from the appropriate officials for the following purposes: to inform
the taxpayer that he has been or may be exposed to occupational hazards, id.
§ 6103(m)(3); to locate individuals who have defaulted on Department of Education-or Department of Health and Human Services-administered student loan
programs, or against whom a federal claim exists under 31 U.S.C. §§ 3711, 3717 or
3718 (1988), id. § 6103(m)(2), (4), (5); to locate individuals who may have contracted the AIDS virus as indicated by blood donations, id. § 6103(m)(6); and, to
mail a social security account statement to any taxpayer entitled to one under the
Social Security Act. Id. § 6103(m)(7). Additionally, the Secretary may disclose to
the media, taxpayer identity information concerning taxpayers entitled to tax refunds where the IRS has not been able to locate such taxpayers. Id. § 6103(m)(1).
22 Id. § 6103(n).
Under the provisions and safeguards of Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6103(n)-1, officers and employees of the Department of Treasury a state tax
agency, the Social Security Administration and the Department ofJustice, Tax Division may disclose returns and return information to any person "to the extent necessary in connection with the processing, storage, transmission, and reproduction
of such returns and return information, the programming, maintenance, repair,
testing, and procurement of equipment, and the providing of other services, for
purposes of tax administration."
I.R.C. § 6103(n) (1992); Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6103(n)-l(a) (1990).
23 I.R.C. § 6103(o). Federal agency officers and employees whose duties require
that they inspect or have disclosed to them returns and return information relating
to taxes imposed by Subtitle E (taxes on alcohol, tobacco and firearms) must be
afforded such access. Id. § 6103(o)(1). Returns and return information relating to
the excise tax on wagering imposed by Code § 4401 shall be available for inspection or disclosure in accordance with Code § 4424. Id. § 6103(o)(2). Under
§ 4424, returns and return information shall be available for inspection or disclosure only in connection with the administration or enforcement of any tax imposed
under the Code. Id. § 4424(b).
24 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) at 354-55.

Congress took particular note of the fact that from 1973 through 1975, the 340 IRS
investigations concerning possible disclosures resulted in 55 disciplinary actions,
11 dismissals and four convictions. Id. The four convictions resulted in a total of
$850 in fines and very short sentences for two individuals (i.e., 24 hours), with
probation for the other two individuals. Id.
25 Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202(d), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
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federal and state employees, 2 6 but against anyone who has access to
returns and return information and willfully prints or publishes that
information in any manner not provided by law,2 7 or anyone who
solicits (by offering in exchange any item of material value) and receives returns or return information if he is aware that the disclosure is unlawful. 8
Congress also added Code section 7217, which provided a civil
remedy for any person who was injured as a result of a willful or
negligent disclosure in violation of section 6103.29 In 1982, section
7431 replaced section 7217.30 The current section 7431 is identical
to old section 7217, with two exceptions. Under the antecedent law,
the individual who made the unlawful disclosure was the defendant
in a taxpayer action.3" Congress believed that this mechanism was
unduly harsh on federal employees who might suffer financial ruin if
held responsible for a simple mistake that resulted in unlawful disclosure. 2 Thus, section 7431 was amended in 1982 to designate
the United States as the defendant in actions brought for knowing
or negligent disclosures of returns or return information made by
federal officers or employees after September 3, 1982." The courts
have agreed that the United States is the sole proper defendant in a
section 7431 action based upon unauthorized disclosures of returns
34
or return information by an employee of the federal government.
Second, section 7431 was amended in 1983 to bring any information obtained under the Code's reporting requirement for
backup withholdings 5 within the definition of "return information"
for the purposes of Code sections 7431 and 6103.36
26 I.R.C. § 7213(a)(1), (2), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202(d), 90 Stat.
1520 (1976).
27 Id. § 7213(a)(3), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202(d), 90 Stat. 1520
(1976).
28 Id. § 7213(a)(4), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202(d), 90 Stat. 1520
(1976).
29 Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202(e), 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
7
30 Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 35 (a), (b), 96 Stat. 645 (1982).
31 I.R.C. § 7217(a) (repealed 1982).
32 Senate Floor Debate from July 22, 1982, 128 CONG. REC. S9,008, reprinted in
[1992] 11 FED. TAXES 2d (PH) 74,311.
33 Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 35 7 (a), 96 Stat. 645 (1982).
34 Agbanc Ltd. v. Berry, 678 F. Supp. 804 (D. Ariz. 1988); Mid-South Music
Corp. v. Kolak (Mfid-South 1), 756 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1984).
35 I.R.C. § 3406.
36 Pub. L. No. 98-67, § 104(b), 97 Stat. 372 (1983) (adding I.R.C. § 7431(f)).
The current version of Code § 7431 reads as follows:
(a) In general.(1) Disclosure by employee of the United States.-If any officer
or employee of the United States knowingly, or by reason of negli-
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7431 ACTIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

The fundamental change in the status of tax returns and return information and the creation of a civil remedy for unauthorized disclosures spawned considerable litigation under sections
7431 and 6103. To prevail under section 7431, the plaintiff must
gence discloses any return or return information with respect to a taxpayer in violation of any provision of section 6103, such taxpayer may
bring a civil action for damages against the United States in a district
court of the United States.
(2) Disclosure by a person who is not an employee of the United
States.-If any person who is not an officer or employee of the United
States knowingly, or by reason of negligence, discloses any return or
return information with respect to a taxpayer in violation of any provision of section 6103, such taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages against such person in a district court of the United States.
(b) No liability for good faith but erroneous interpretation.-No liability shall arise under this section with respect to any disclosure
which results from a good faith, but erroneous, interpretation of section 6103.
(c) Dzmages.-In any action brought under subsection (a), upon a
finding of liability on the part of the defendant, the defendant shall be
liable to the plaintiff in an amount equal to the sum of(1) the greater of(A) $1,000 for each act of unauthorized disclosure of a return or return information with respect to which such defendant is found liable, or
(B) the sum of(i) the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of such unauthorized disclosure, plus
(ii) in the case of a willful disclosure or a disclosure
which is the result of gross negligence, punitive damages,
plus
(2) the costs of the action.
(d) Period for bringing action.-Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
an action to enforce any liability created under this section may be brought,
without regard to the amount in controversy, at any time within 2 years after
the date of discovery by the plaintiff of the unauthorized disclosure.
(e) Return; return information.-For purposes of this section, the terms "return" and "return information" have the respective meaning given such
terms in section 6103(b).
(f) Extension to information obtained under section 3406.-For purposes of
this section(1) any information obtained under section 3406 (including information with respect to any payee certification failure under subsection
(d) thereof) shall be treated as return information, and
(2) any use of such information other than for purposes of meeting
any requirement under section 3406 or (subject to the safeguards set
forth in section 6103) for purposes permitted under section 6103
shall be treated as a violation of section 6103.
For purposes of subsection (b), the reference to section 6103 shall be treated
as including a reference to section 3406.
I.R.C. § 7431 (1992).
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demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence the unauthorized nature of the disclosure, that the disclosure was knowingly
or negligently made, and that the disclosure violated section
6103. 37 Most of this litigation has focused on the determination
of four main issues: what constitutes return information; when is
a disclosure of a return or return information unauthorized; what
standard should apply under the good faith defense; and the
proper amount of damages to be awarded. This section examines each of these issues in turn.
WHAT CONSTITUTES RETURN INFORMATION?

The term "return information" is defined in section 6103(b)
as:
a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments, receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax withheld,
deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments, whether the
taxpayer's return was, is being, or will be examined or subject
to other investigation or processing, or any other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected
by the Secretary with respect to a return .... 38
Specifically excluded from this definition is data that cannot be associated with a taxpayer or does not reveal, directly or indirectly, a
taxpayer's identity.
The definition of return information under section 6103(b) has
evolved to include virtually any information collected by the Internal Revenue Service regarding a person's tax liability. 40 For example, in Solargistic Corp. v. United States,4 the Internal Revenue Service
(Service or IRS) sent to tax shelter investors pre-filing notices stating that the company was under IRS audit; the Seventh Circuit held
that the notices constituted return information because they disclosed to the investors that the company was a taxpayer and that its
return had been examined.4 2 Additionally, the district court in Mallas v. Kolak 4 3 held that the tax fraud convictions of certain taxpayers
comprised return information under section 6103. Moreover, in Di37 Flippo v. United States, 670 F. Supp. 638, 641 (W.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd mene.,
849 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1988).
38 I.R.C. § 6103(b)(2)(A) (1992).
39 Id. § 6103(b)(2).
40 Dowd v. Calabrese, 101 F.R.D. 427, 438 (D.D.C. 1984).
41 921 F.2d 729 (7th Cir. 1991).
42 Id. at 730-31.
43 721 F. Supp. 748, 754-55 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
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amond v. United States,4 4 the Eighth Circuit declared that the inclusion
of the identifier "Criminal Investigation Division" in circular letters
sent to the physician taxpayer's patients caused the letters to constitute return information, for the identifier made known to the letter's
recipients that the taxpayer was under criminal investigation.4 5
Courts have also included within the definition of return information IRS-prepared memoranda and background information with
respect to IRS revenue rulings and regulations, 4 6 as well as an IRS
investigation report concerning whether an agent had violated section 6103."7
Initially, the Sixth Circuit reported in Mid-South Music Corp. v.
Kolak (Mid-South 1)48 that the taxpayer Mid-South stated a colorable
claim for the unauthorized disclosure of return information.4 9 MidSouth's complaint alleged that pre-filing notices, which stated that
"[b]ased upon our review of that promotion, the indications are that
the purported tax deductions are not allowable," sent by the IRS to
investors in pass-through tax shelters marketed by Mid-South, improperly identified Mid-South as a taxpayer under IRS investigation.50 Subsequently, in Mid-South Music Corp. v. United States (MidSouth II),5" the court determined that although the pre-filing letter

identified Mid-South as a promoter of tax shelters and advised investors that the IRS would disallow deductions based on its review
of the promotion, there was no indication that Mid-South's tax returns had been examined. As a result, the court determined that the
information in the pre-filing letters was not the return information
of Mid-South.5 2
44

944 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1991).

45 Id. at 435. Liability did not attach to the IRS, however, under the good faith

defense of § 7431 (b). Id. The Tenth Circuit reached a similar result in DiAndre v.
United States, 968 F.2d 1049 (10th Cir. 1992). Disclosures of the type protected
under the good faith defense in Diamond and DiAndre should constitute § 6103 violations if they occur after the Diamond decision. See also Marre v. United States, 92-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,398 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
46 King v. I.R.S., 688 F.2d 488, 494 (7th Cir. 1982).
47 Conn v. United States, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,123 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
48 756 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1984).
49 Id. at 25.
50 Id. See Mid-South Music Corp. v. United States (Mid-South II), 818 F.2d 536,
537 (6th Cir. 1987). Upon remand, the district court held the pre-filing letter did
indeed contain return information. Mid-South Music Corp. v. United States, 85-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9782 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
51 818 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1987).
52 Id. at 539. The Tenth Circuit has advanced a similar conclusion. See First W.
Gov't Sec. v. United States, 796 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1986) (applying Mid-South llike reasoning to a revised Revenue Agent's Report rather than a pre-filing letter).
See also Balanced Fin. Mgmt., Inc. v. Fay, 662 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1987).
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While this holding appears to be somewhat of a stretch, it embodies good policy. Mid-South H allows the Service to inform investors in pass-through entities that some or all of the deductions
generated by such entities will not be allowed prior to the filing of
their individual returns. Without the holding in Mid-South H, these
investors would be saddled with the burden of a subsequent audit.
The Seventh Circuit has recognized another exception to the
broad interpretation of return information. In Thomas v. United
States,5 3 the court held that information the immediate source of
which was a public document prepared lawfully by an agency, other
than the IRS, with legal access to tax returns or return information,
does not comprise return information for the purposes of sections
7431 and 6103.54 In Thomas, the court considered a press release
compiled from a United States Tax Court opinion." In effect, the
Seventh Circuit maintained that while the IRS may not publicize tax
returns, it may publicize Tax Court opinions.5 6
WHEN IS A DISCLOSURE UNAUTHORIZED?

The Reach of Confidentiality
Courts have struggled in determining when the protection of
confidentiality ceases for return information and as a result may
be disclosed. For example, in Long v. IRS,57 the plaintiff sought
the data tapes and some of the check sheets that the IRS used in
the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP), a
continuing series of statistical studies conducted by the IRS to
determine the level of compliance with federal tax laws. 58 The
Service had already released the statistical tabulations based on
the TCMP, but the plaintiff wanted to test the validity of the statistical tabulations by referring to the source data. The IRS refused the request on several grounds, including an assertion that
section 6103 prevented the Service from disclosing the source
data.5 9
53 890 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1989).
54 Id. at 21.
55 Id. at 20.
56 Id. at 21.
57 596 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 917 (1980). The plaintiff
utilized the Freedom of Information Act after identifying that information had been
deleted. Id.
58

Id. at 364.

Id. at 367. Interestingly, as the court pointed out, the IRS did not argue that
the disclosure would be unnecessary under exemption 7(E) of the Freedom of Information Act. This exemption "permits withholding of investigating records compiled for law enforcement purposes which disclose investigative techniques and
59
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The Ninth Circuit disagreed. While noting that the clear
purpose of section 6103 is to protect taxpayers' privacy, the Long
court held that section 6103(b)(2) 6 0 permits the disclosure of
useful data, without reformation by the IRS, which does not pose
6
a serious risk of a privacy breach. '
In a later case, King v. IRS,6 2 the Seventh Circuit disagreed
with the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Long, and held that section 6103
permits widespread public disclosure of return information only
if it is "amalgamated" with data from other taxpayers and released in the form of a statistical tabulation or study. 3 Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court, in Church of Scientology
V. IRS, 64 agreed with the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in King.
The Court maintained that merely deleting identifying information from return information, without some reformation of that
data, does not deprive the return information of section 6103
65
protection.

Although it is generally agreed that what transpires in court
is a matter of public record,6 6 the issue of whether confidential
return information loses its section 6103 protection if the return
information is aired in open court has been problematic. Husby v.
procedures." Id. at 368 n.6. Subsequent to the Long case, Code § 6103(b) was
amended by Pub. L. No. 97-34, Title VII, § 701(a), 95 Stat. 340 (August 18, 1981),
to permit the Treasury Secretary to determine if the disclosure of standards employed to select returns for examination or data used to establish such standards
would "seriously impair assessment, collection, or enforcement under the internal
revenue laws." I.R.C. § 6103(b) (1992). The Code does not require the disclosure
of these standards or data. Id.
60 The specific statutory language at issue in Long, known as the Haskell Amendment, appears immediately after the definition of return information in Code
§ 6103(b)(2)(B) (1992). The provision reads as follows: "[B]ut such term does not
include data in a form which cannot be associated with, or otherwise identify, directly or indirectly, a particular taxpayer." Id. § 6103(b)(2). See Church of
Scientology of California v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9 (1987); Curie v. IRS, 704 F.2d 523
(11th Cir. 1983); King v. I.R.S., 688 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1982).
61 Long, 596 F.2d at 368.
62 688 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1982). See also Currie v. IRS, 704 F.2d 523 (11 th Cir.
1983).
63 King, 688 F.2d at 493.
64 484 U.S. 9 (1987).
65 Id. at 18.
66 See Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947):
A trial is a public event. What transpires in the court room is public
property. If a transcript of the court proceedings had been published,
we support none would claim that the judge could punish the publisher for contempt ....Those who see and hear what transpired can
report it with impunity.
Id. See also Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); Cooper v.
IRS, 450 F. Supp. 752 (D.D.C. 1977).
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United States6 7 presented this issue. The Husbys received a notice
of deficiency from the IRS in March, 1986. In June of that year,
the Husbys filed a petition with the tax court to reassess the deficiency. Despite the tax court petition, the IRS made an assessment against the Husbys in September, 1986, for $47,000. The
Husbys notified the IRS a few days later of their contention that
the assessment was illegal. The IRS issued a notice for demand
of payment in November, 1986. The Husbys again notified the
IRS of the illegality of the assessments and the demands for payment, and an IRS representative acknowledged the error. Nevertheless, the Husbys received two more demands for payment
over the next two months. After each demand the Husbys registered their position that the demands were illegal due to the tax
court petition.
In March and April, 1987, the IRS served levies on a bank
account and a brokerage account owned by the Husbys. In April,
1987, the District Court for the Northern District of California
enjoined the IRS from further disclosing any tax return information or making any further collection efforts with respect to the
Husbys concerning the deficiency subject to the tax court petition. At a hearing, the Service admitted its actions had been in
error. Soon thereafter, however, the IRS again served a notice of
levy on the Husbys' brokerage account and filed a federal tax lien
in the Husbys' home county.6 8
The Husbys filed a section 7431 action for the unauthorized
disclosure of tax return information. 69 The IRS admitted its erroneous actions, but argued that liability under section 7431
should not attach due to the tax court petition filed by the Husbys. The IRS claimed that once the tax court petition was filed,
the Husbys' names and social security numbers, as well as their
debt for back taxes, became a matter of public record and thus
did not receive section 6103 protection.7"
The district court agreed that as a result of the filing, the
Husbys' names and social security numbers were no longer confidential. That the Husbys owed back taxes was another matter,
however. The court stated that the very reason for the tax court
filing was to determine whether any back taxes were due. If the
IRS's contentions were true, the court reasoned, taxpayers would
67
68
69
70

672 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
Id. at 443-44.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 444.
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be forced to decide whether to challenge an IRS deficiency notice
or enjoy the protections of section 6103. 7'
In cases where return information actually has been disclosed in open court, the circuit courts have split on their approach. In Rodgers v. Hyatt,72 the plaintiff taxpayer Rodgers
subpoenaed Hyatt, an IRS criminal investigation agent, in connection with a hearing to enforce an IRS summons issued to
Rodgers's bank. Rodgers's attorney questioned Hyatt concerning the IRS investigation of plaintiff's tax return. Hyatt also testified that the investigation resulted from law enforcement
agencies' tips that Rodgers was dealing in stolen oil. The agent
stated that the Service was investigating whether Rodgers had reported any stolen oil income on his return.73
Two months later, Hyatt, in a meeting with local Amax Coal
Company officials, asked about Rodgers's dealings with Amax
and told the officials that Rodgers was suspected of dealing in
stolen oil. 74 Rodgers filed a section 7217 action, alleging that
Hyatt made an unauthorized return information disclosure in violation of section 6103. 75
Hyatt contended that the return information's prior in-court
disclosure, i.e., at the summons hearing, removed the statement
concerning Rodgers's alleged dealings in stolen oil from section
6103 protection. 76 The Tenth Circuit disagreed. The court
maintained that the return information's previous disclosure in
court did not justify Hyatt's subsequent disclosure of such information. 77 The Rodgers court endorsed a literal reading of section
6103. The Tenth Circuit determined that because the section explicitly forbids an officer of the United States from disclosing return information without an express authorization, and because
there is no provision in the section that authorizes the disclosure
of return information once it has been aired in open court, Hyatt's disclosure was unauthorized even though the return infor71 Id. But cf Messinger v. United States, 769 F. Supp. 935 (D. Md. 1991) (concluding that return information was no longer confidential after inclusion in materials submitted to tax court by taxpayer); Thomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18 (7th
Cir. 1989) (holding that information compiled from a tax court opinion and issued
in the form of a press release did not comprise return information).
72 697 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1983).

73 Id. at 900.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 900-01.
76

Id. at 902.

77 Id. at 906.
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mation was a matter of public record.7 8
In Lampert v. United States, 79 the Ninth Circuit refused to follow the Tenth Circuit's lead. Lampert was a consolidation of three
similar cases from the District Court for the Northern District of
California."0 In each of the cases the disclosures in question were
government press releases.8 '
The Lampert court relied on several district court cases that
had allowed government disclosures once the return information
became a matter of public record. 2 The Ninth Circuit refused a
literal reading of section 6103, holding that upon the lawful disclosure of return information in ajudicial forum, subsequent disclosures did not violate section 6103.83
The Ninth Circuit has extended its Lampert reasoning to contexts other than IRS press releases summarizing enforcement actions. For example, in William E. Schrambling Accountancy Corp. v.
United States,84 the Ninth Circuit held that once return informa78 Id. The Tenth Circuit has reaffirmed its position, as articulated in Rodgers,
regarding the in court disclosure of return information. See Chandler v. United
States, 887 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir. 1989). See also Malis v. United States, 87-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 9212 (C.D. Cal. 1986). Several district courts have agreed with
the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Rodgers. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sawyer, 640 F. Supp.
1126 (S.D. Tex. 1986); Olsen v. Egger, 594 F. Supp. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
79 854 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
80 See Figur v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Peinado v.
United States, 669 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Lampert v. United States, 87-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9361 (N.D. Cal. 1987), afftd, 854 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1034 (1989).
81 In Figurv. United States, the press release was a summary of the charges filed
against the taxpayer contained in a criminal information. Figur, 662 F. Supp. at
516. The U.S. Attorney's Office issued the press release on the same day that the
information was filed and the taxpayer pled guilty. Id. The two press releases in
Peinado v, United States announced that the taxpayer had pled guilty to two counts of
tax evasion and that the taxpayer had been sentenced on those convictions.
Peinado, 669 F. Supp. at 953-54. In Lampert v. United States, two press releases were
issued" that detailed the filing of an action by the government seeking to permanently enjoin the taxpayer from promoting and selling an abusive tax shelter.
Lampert, 87-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9361 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
82 Lampert, 854 F.2d at 337-38. See Thomas v. United States, 671 F. Supp. 15
(E.D. Wis. 1987), aff'd, 890 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1989); United Energy Corp. v. United
States, 622 F. Supp. 43 (N.D. Cal. 1985); United States v. Posner, 594 F. Supp. 930
(S.D. Fla. 1984); Cooper v. I.R.S., 450 F. Supp. 752 (D.D.C. 1977).
83 Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338. See also Messinger v. United States, 769 F. Supp. 935
(D. Md. 1991) (holding that return information contained in notice of backup withholding was not confidential because information was included in materials
presented to tax court by taxpayer); Noske v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 50,429 (D. Minn. 1992) (stating that plaintiffs no longer possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy concerning their return information once it was
properly disclosed in the public record of a judicial proceeding).
84 937 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 956 (1992).
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tion is included in a publicly recorded tax lien or as part of a
taxpayer-filed bankruptcy action, the taxpayer can no longer expect confidentiality. s5 As a result, subsequent disclosures of the
return information did not violate section 6103.
Disclosures Made During the Course of Investigation
During the course of a tax investigation, an IRS agent might
employ several investigative techniques, including interviewing
third parties about the taxpayer's business activities, examining
taxpayer records and accounts, and communicating with investors in companies under investigation. Certain disclosures for investigative purposes are authorized under section 6103(k)(6):
An internal revenue officer or employee may, in connection
with his official duties relating to any audit, collection activity,
or civil or criminal tax investigation or any other offense under
the internal revenue laws, disclose return information to the
extent that such disclosure is necessary in obtaining information, which is not otherwise reasonably available .... 86
The courts have usually taken the position that disclosure
should be made only as a last resort. Rodgers v. Hyatt, 7 discussed
above, involved an IRS agent's release of a taxpayer's return information to third parties who were being interviewed during the
course of a criminal investigation.8 8 The Tenth Circuit stated that
the disclosure was "clearly unauthorized" and particularly abusive
in that the IRS agent had no reason prior to his meeting with the
third parties to suspect that they knew of the rumors of illegality
concerning the taxpayer.8 9
Disclosures to third parties also occur in government efforts to
substantiate taxpayer records. Barrett v. United States9 0 involved such
85 Id. at 1489.
86 I.R.C. § 6103(k)(6) (1992). The corresponding regulation provides that dis-

closure can be made:
[O]nly if the necessary information cannot, under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, otherwise reasonably be obtained in
accurate and sufficiently probative form, or in a timely manner, and
without impairing the proper performance of the official duties, or if
such activities cannot otherwise properly be accomplished without
making such disclosure.
Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-l(a) (1990).
87 697 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1983).
88 See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
89 Rodgers,

697 F.2d at 906.

795 F.2d 446 (5th Cir. 1986). Although there is no published opinion that
determines whether the disclosures in Barrett violated § 6103, Dr. Barrett appeared
90

before the Fifth Circuit five more times concerning the disclosures made by the IRS
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a disclosure. To procure information relating to payments received
by the physician taxpayer, the IRS sent letters to several hundred of
the physician's patients. The specially prepared letters stated that
the Criminal Investigation Division of the IRS was investigating the
doctor for certain years and solicited details of payments made to
the physician. Reversing a district court summary judgment in favor
of the government, the Fifth Circuit held that the relevant inquiry is
not "whether the information sought is necessary: the questions are
whether the disclosures are 'necessary' to obtain the information
sought and whether the information sought is 'otherwise reasonably
available.' "9 The Barrett court determined that disclosure of the
taxpayer's name was clearly necessary, assuming that it was necessary to send the letter. The Fifth Circuit asserted, however, that
whether it was necessary to disclose that the taxpayer was under
9 2
criminal investigation constituted a genuine issue of fact.
Heller v. Plave9 3 also involved disclosures to third parties made
during an IRS investigation. IRS Special Agent Plave sent at least
seven letters to third parties who, he believed, possessed information concerning Heller's business activities; the letters stated that
Plave was conducting a criminal investigation of Heller, a prominent
Dade County, Florida attorney.9 4 Eight different witnesses testified
that the Special Agent had questioned them, in person, about Helduring its investigation. The issue in four of the cases was whether a district court
could conditionally enforce a summons in order to prevent § 6103 violations. See
United States v. Texas Heart Inst., 755 F.2d 469 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Barrett, 787 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1986) (Barrett I), withdrawn and new opinion substituted,
804 F.2d 1376 (1986), reh'g en banc granted, 812 F.2d 936 (1987); United States v.
Barrett, 837 F.2d 1341 (1988). The Fifth Circuit finally decided the district court
did not possess the authority to enforce conditionally a summons due to § 6103
violations. The issue is far from settled, however. For example, the Ninth Circuit
relied on the Texas Heart opinion to allow conditional enforcement of summonses
due to § 6103 violations in United States v. Author Servs., Inc., 804 F.2d 1520 (9th
Cir. 1986), citationsamended, 811 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1987). The Ninth Circuit subsequently followed Author Servs. in United States v. Zolin, 804 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir.
1987). Dr. Barrett's last visit to the Fifth Circuit was an unsuccessful action to
quash grand jury subpoenas and to terminate grand jury proceedings. In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas on Barrett, 818 F.2d 330 (5th Cir. 1987).
91 Barrett, 795 F.2d at 451.
92 Id. In a 1991 case, the Eighth Circuit held that it was unnecessary under Code
§ 6103(k) to include the identification of an agent signing letters sent to a physician
taxpayer's patients as a member of the Service's Criminal Investigation Division.
Diamond v. United States, 944 F.2d 431, 434-35 (8th Cir. 1991), reh'g denied, 1991
U.S. App. LEXIS 25773 (8th Cir. 1991). Furthermore, the court noted that the
information sought could have been secured by simply signing as an IRS agent. See
also Marre v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,398 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
93 657 F. Supp. 95 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
94 Id. at 96.
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ler. Some of these witnesses testified that Plave had told them that
he was " 'out to get' " Heller.9 5 Furthermore, Plave indicated that
Heller would be indicted, would not continue his legal practice, was
" 'unscrupulous,' " and was guilty of tax evasion.9 6 In addition,
Plave testified that he had characterized Heller as " 'a despicable
human being.' "9 The Heller court determined that such disclosures and characterizations violated section 6103 because they were
not necessary and because the information could have been obtained merely by disclosing the taxpayer's name and occupation and
making a request for the information.9"
It is also possible for an unauthorized disclosure to occur during the course of communications with investors in a company
under investigation. 9 9 A series of cases at the circuit court level has
recognized the validity of most disclosures of accurate return information to investors in a pass-through entity.' 0 0 In Mallas v. Kolack,'' however, the return information disclosed to the investors
contained inaccuracies. James G. Mallas and Robert V. Jones organized, advertised and sold a tax shelter based on deductions granted
to participants in coal mining enterprises. In 1984, after an investigation into the deductions' validity by the IRS's Criminal Investigation Division, Mallas and Jones were convicted on sixteen counts of
fraud and tax evasion in connection with their tax shelter activities. 10 2 Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit reversed the convictions. 13 Nearly a year later, however, the IRS mailed Pro Forma
Revenue Agent Report (RAR) forms to several participants in the
tax shelter program. In addition to informing the investors that the
deductions they had previously claimed in connection with the tax
shelter would be disallowed, the form also disclosed that Mallas and
95 Id.
96 Id.

Id. at 97.
Id. at 98-99.
99 See Solargistic Corp. v. United States, 921 F.2d 729 (7th Cir. 1991); MidSouth Music Corp. v. United States (Mid-South II), 818 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1987);
First W. Gov't Sec., Inc. v. United States, 796 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1986); Mid-South
Music Corp. v. Kolak (Mid-South I), 756 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1985); Mallas v. Kolack,
721 F. Supp. 748 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
100 But see Marre v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,398 (S.D. Tex.
1992) (reasoning that an IRS agent's failure to follow the IRS guidelines for communications with investors resulted in the disclosure of return information in violation of § 6103, although the return information disclosed may have been accurate).
101 721 F. Supp. 748 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
102 Id. at 750.
103 United States v. Mallas, 762 F.2d 361, 361 (4th Cir. 1985).
97
98
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Jones had been convicted of tax fraud.' ° 4 The RAR did not, however, mention the subsequent reversals of the convictions.
Mallas and Jones brought suit on the RAR's failure to include
the reversals. Responding to the government's motion to dismiss,
the Mallas court reasoned that because the portion of the RAR regarding the convictions was inaccurate, this portion comprised an
unauthorized disclosure under section 6103. Because the IRS was
negligent in determining whether the RAR was accurate, the district
court also declared that the disclosures were actionable under section 743 1.105
In another case involving investors in a company under investigation, First Western Government Securities, Inc. v. United States, 10 6 the
IRS identified the plaintiff as a promoter of an abusive tax shelter,
First Western. Subsequently, the Service audited twenty-five of the
plaintiff's customers and issued an RAR to the customers explaining
why the deductions arising from their investments with First Western were denied.' 1 7 After issuance of the RAR, Sidney Samuels,
president of First Western, invoked the Fifth Amendment 135 times
at a deposition in connection with the IRS's investigation of First
Western's promotional activities. 0l ' The IRS subsequently revised
the RAR to include Samuels's invocations and sent the revised form
to some of the customers who had received the earlier RAR.'° 9 The
Tenth Circuit held that even if the information disclosed in the RAR
constituted return information, its disclosure was authorized under
section 6103(h)(4)(C) because the customers were parties to an administrative proceeding, i.e., the audits. Furthermore, the information disclosed clearly corresponded to a transactional relationship
between the customers and the plaintiff that directly affected the
resolution of an issue in the proceeding."o
Similar to First Western, the 1984 case of Mid-South Music Corp. v.
Kolak (Mid-South I),

11

dealt with communications to investors in a

105
106

Mallas, 721 F. Supp. at 750.
Id. at 755
796 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1986).

107
108

Id. at 357, 358.
Id. at 358.

104

109 Id.

110 Id. at 360. See also Lebaron v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 947 (C.D. Cal.
1992). Cf Noske v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,429 (D. Minn.
1992) (holding that an in-court disclosure of return information of a non-party to a
judicial tax proceeding was authorized under § 6103(h)(4)(C), as long as there was
a transactional relationship between the non-party and the party to the proceeding
that directly affected the resolution of the proceeding).
''' 756 F.2d 23 (6th Cir. 1984).
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company under IRS review. In Mid-South I, the Service sent a letter
to investors in a tax shelter marketed by Mid-South Music Corp. informing the investors that, based on its review of Mid-South, deductions from the investment would not be allowed and that if the
deductions were claimed, the investors would be subject to penalties.' 1 2 Overturning the district court's dismissal of a Mid-South's
section 7431 action, the Sixth Circuit submitted that the letter disclosed to the investors that Mid-South was a taxpayer and that the
IRS was conducting an investigation of Mid-South." 3 Such disclosures alone, the court decided, might support a colorable claim
under section 7431. The Mid-South I court remanded the case for a
consideration of whether the disclosures might have been authorized under section 6103(e), involving disclosures to persons with a
4
material interest in a return, or any other exception.'"
On remand, the district court held that the pre-filing letter contained return information, i.e., that the IRS examined Mid-South's
tax return and that Mid-South's promotion was subject to further
investigation or proceedings, and that such information was disclosed to the investors in violation of section 6103.1 5 On appeal,
the Sixth Circuit reversed its prior position and determined, in MidSouth H, that the letter did not indicate that Mid-South's returns
were under examination or subject to further investigation or proceedings." 6 The Mid-South II court decided that the IRS simply
warned the investors by disclosing return information to them concerning their own returns, an allowable disclosure under section
IT
6103.1
112

The IRS letter read as follows:
Re: Tax Shelter Promotion: Mid-South Music Corporation

Dear Taxpayer:
Our information indicates that you invested in the above-named tax
shelter in 1982. Based upon our review of that promotion, the indications are that the purported tax deductions are not allowable.

If you claim such deductions on your income tax return, your return will be examined and the deductions disallowed. With respect to
the tax shelter deductions, you may be subjecting yourself to a negligence penalty ....
Mid-South Music Corp. v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 579 F. Supp. 481, 482
n.1 (M.D. Tenn. 1983).
1'3 Mid-South I, 756 F.2d at 25.
114

Id. at 25-26.

115 Mid-South Music Corp. v. United States, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)

9782
(M.D. Tenn. 1985).
116 Mid-South Music Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 536, 539 (6th Cir. 1987).
117 Id. In a concurring opinion, Judge Welford proclaimed that the rationale of

the Tenth Circuit's First Western opinion "add[ed] an additional basis for reversing
the district court." Id. at 540 (Wellford, J., concurring). Judge Wellford asserted
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Solargistic Corp. v. United States 118 also involved IRS communications to investors. The Service sent a pre-filing letter to each Solargistic investor, stating that the company was under audit by the IRS
and that any adjustments made to Solargistic's return would affect
the investor's return.'19 The Seventh Circuit declared that the IRS
audit of Solargistic constituted return information of both the company and the individual investors. 2 ' The Seventh Circuit read section 6103(e)(7) in conjunction with section 6103(e)(1) 2 ' to
authorize the disclosure of an individual's return information to that
individual.' 2 2 The court found that the disclosure to the Solargistic
investors was authorized under sections 6103(e)(1) and (7) because
individual investor returns were directly affected by any adjustments
23
resulting from an IRS audit of Solargistic, a pass-through entity.'

Disclosures Made During the Process of Collection
Generally, a four-step process is necessary for the IRS to
properly levy against property. 24 First, there must be a determination of a deficiency followed by a notification to the taxpayer.
The taxpayer is given thirty days to respond to this determination notice.' 2 5 If the thirty-day period expires without taxpayer
response, a ninety-day letter is sent to the taxpayer, which allows
an additional ninety days to respond to the notice of deficiency.' 2 6 If the taxpayer fails to respond properly within the
ninety-day period, the Treasury Secretary makes an assessment
that "the rationale of First Western is applicable in this situation even if the investors
in Mid-South may not themselves have been under investigation when they received the prefiling notification letter." Id.
118 921 F.2d 729 (7th Cir. 1991).
''9 Id. at 730.
120 Id. at 731.
121 Code § 6103(e)(1)

allows the return of an individual to be inspected by that
individual. I.R.C. § 6103(e)(1). Code § 6103(e)(7) allows return information to be
disclosed to any person authorized by the subsection to inspect a return. Id.
§ 6103(e)(7).
122 Solargistic Corp., 921 F.2d at 731. The court relied on Balanced Fin. Mgmt.,
Inc. v. Fay, 662 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1987), and the concurring opinion ofJudge
Merritt in Mid-South II, in reaching its conclusion that the return information of a
pass-through entity is also the return information of the individual investors. Id. at
731-32. Those opinions also construed § 6103(e)(l) and (7) to allow the disclosure
of an individual's return information to that individual. Id. at 731.
123 Id. at 731 n.3.
124 Michael A. Mische &Jermoe S. Horvitz, Remedies to Wrongful Seizures: An Analysis of the Determination, Notification, Demand, and Levy Processes, 9 REV. OF TAx'N. OF
INDIV., 254, 256-63 (1985). The applicable Code sections are 6201, 6203, 6212,
6213, 6303 and 6331.
125 Mische & Horvitz, supra note 124, at 258.
126

Id.
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and demands payment of the tax, usually within sixty days of the
assessment. 1 2 7 Failure to demand payment before a levy is made
defeats the collection process. 1 8 Although not necessary, a final
notice and demand are usually sent to the taxpayer before property is seized. 129 If the taxpayer files a petition with the tax court
at any juncture, further collection efforts are prohibited until the
tax court renders a decision. 3 0 The Service's failure to properly
follow levying procedures can defeat any collection attempt. 131
By its nature, a levy comprises a public notice of a taxpayer
deficiency and, as such, involves the disclosure of return information. The disclosure of return information in connection with official duties relating to any collection activity constitutes an
authorized disclosure under section 6103.132 The issue generally
presented to courts with regard to IRS collection efforts is
whether the return information disclosure remains authorized
under section 6103 if the levy procedure was improper or in
error.
In 1985, the Eighth Circuit considered this issue in Rorex v.
Traynor. 133 The plaintiff taxpayers, the Rorexes, had executed an
installment agreement with Traynor, a revenue officer trainee, to
pay their deficient income taxes for the years 1977, 1979 and
1980. After a disagreement over the timeliness of their installment payments, the taxpayers entered into a second installment
agreement. The trainee's supervisor subsequently disapproved
the second agreement, although the Rorexes had met their obligations under the agreement. Without notifying the Rorexes
that the second installment agreement had been disapproved, the
IRS served a notice of levy on the taxpayers' bank.' 1 4 Traynor
argued that the disclosure to the bank of return information was
Id. at 260.
Id.
Id. at 269.
Id. at 260.
131 Id. at 268.
132 Id.; I.R.C. § 6103(k)(6) (1992); Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-l (1990).
133 771 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1985).
134 Id. at 384-85. Whether Traynor actually advised the Rorexes of the disapproval was disputed at trial: "Traynor testified that on September 16, 1981, he informed the taxpayers of the disapproval and requested full payment. Harold Rorex
contested this testimony and stated that he had never been notified of the disapproval." Id. at 385. The Eighth Circuit explained that "we must regard the evidence in this case as proving that Traynor served a notice of.levy on the taxpayers'
bank without ever notifying them that their second installment agreement had been
disapproved, even though the agreement states on its face that the taxpayers would
receive notice of disapproval." Id. at 387.
127
128
129
130
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authorized as long as such information was not more than necessary to accomplish the levy, regardless of whether the levy was
lawful.' 35 The court rejected Traynor's argument, reasoning that
all disclosures would be authorized as long as no more return
information was disclosed than was necessary to effectuate the
levy. 1

36

Traynor relied on a district court case, Timmerman v. Swenson,' 3 7 which held that the disclosure of return information pursuant to a levy served on a bank with which the taxpayer had no
connection did not violate section 6103 because the levy was is3
sued to the wrong bank as a result of an IRS ministerial error. 1
The Rorex court rejected the Timmerman decision as inconsistent
with the Code's statutory scheme. 139 Furthermore, improper underlying assessments 4 ' and the failure to issue a final notice and
demand' 4 ' have been held to invalidate a levy and to render the
levy's disclosure of return information unauthorized.
Some courts have shown a tendency to strictly enforce sec135 Id. at 386.
136 Id.
137 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)

9588 (D. Minn. 1979).
Rorex, 771 F.2d at 386. See Christensen v. United States, 733 F. Supp. 844
(D.N.J. 1990) (declaring that holding the IRS liable for a computer error would
subject the Service to a higher standard than Congress anticipated), aff'd, 925 F.2d
416 (3d Cir. 1991); Weiner v. IRS - Collections Div., 789 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (finding that an IRS computer error without evidence of negligence is not
sufficient to support a § 7431 action); Messinger v. United States, 769 F. Supp. 935
(D. Md. 1991) (holding that a disclosure resulting solely from computer error is not
an improper disclosure); Brown v. United States, 755 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Cal. 1990)
(reasoning that an error representing .001% of total deficiency may not be
material).
139 Rorex, 771 F.2d at 386.
140 Husby v. United States, 672 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Cal. 1987). See also Coplin
and Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,017 (W.D. Mich.
1992) (holding that the government may disclose return information in order to
locate resources to satisfy a lien, regardless of whether the lien was proper); United
States v. Lisle, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,286 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (deciding that
the validity of liens is not relevant to the determination of a claim under § 7431);
Chisum v. United States, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,032 (D. Ariz. 1991) (concluding that a judicial determination of an assessment could not be obtained in the
context of a § 7431 action); Elias v. United States, 91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,040 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (determining that the propriety of an underlying assessment could not be collaterally challenged in a § 7431 action).
141 William E. Schrambling Accountancy Corp. v. United States, 689 F. Supp.
1001 (N.D. Cal. 1988), rev d, 937 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
956 (1992). The Ninth Circuit reversed on the theory that although the IRS had
failed to issue the final notice and demand, the inclusion of the return information
in a publicly recorded tax lien removed the return information from the protection
of§ 6103. Schrambling, 937 F.2d at 1489. Failing to issue a final notice and demand
should still support a § 7431 action as long as no public tax lien has been filed.
138
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tion 6103 violations resulting from negligent, erroneous IRS levies. In Chandlerv. United States, 14 2 the IRS served a notice of levy
on the taxpayers' employer; the notice was in error because the
taxpayers had paid the tax.' 4 3 The payment was not credited to
the taxpayers' account because they failed to write their taxpayer
identification number on the check as the instructions required. 14 4 The district court maintained that the taxpayers' omission did not prove fatal to their action because the IRS was
capable of properly identifying and crediting the taxpayers' account through a computer program called "SSNAD," but failed
to do so, resulting in the erroneous levy.' 4 5 In contrast to Chandler, two district courts have held that clearly erroneous levies did
not support a section 7431 action because the plaintiffs' return
1 46
information was not disclosed.
Disclosures Made to State and Local Governments
In drafting section 6103, Congress recognized that states
and their subdivisions require access to federal tax return information to compare federal and state or local returns for discrepancies. "4 7 Section 6103(d) allows for the disclosure of returns
and return information to designated representatives of state and
local agencies who are charged with the administration of tax
laws.' 4 8 The disclosures can be made only: i) to the extent necessary for the administration of tax laws; ii) upon receipt of written
request from the head of the agency responsible for tax law administration; and iii) to the legally-designated representative of
the agency.1 4 9
687 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Utah 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 1397 (10th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1516.
Id.
Id. at 1521.
See Brown v. United States, 755 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Haywood v.
United States, 642 F. Supp. 188 (D. Kan. 1986). In Brown, a levy that correctly
stated that the taxpayer owed over $18,000 in back taxes included an amount for
$23.52 that was attributable only to the plaintiff's ex-husband. The court held that
although the levy contained an error, the return information disclosed in error was
that of her ex-husband. As a result, the plaintiff's return information was not improperly disclosed. Id. at 286-87. In so ruling, the Brown court relied heavily on
the Haywood decision, describing the 1986 case as "provid[ing] sound reasoning
pertinent to the present case." Id. at 286. Perhaps Mr. Brown could have successfully brought a § 7431 action.
142

143
144
145
146

147 STAFF OF JOINT COMM.

ON INT. REV.

EXPLANATION OF THE TAx REFORM ACT OF
148 I.R.C. § 6103(d)(1) (1992).
149

Id.

TAx.,

94TH CONG.,

2D SESS.,

GENERAL

1976, 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) at 332.
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Pursuant to section 6103(p)(1),' 5 0 the IRS developed procedures for disclosing returns and return information to the states
and state agencies authorized under section 6103(d).1 5 1 These
procedures are contained in a handbook for IRS personnel.' 5 2 A
Coordination Agreement serves as the basic agreement providing for the mutual exchange of tax information between the Service and each state agency authorized to receive tax returns and
return information. 153 Additionally, such state agencies and the
IRS are parties to an Implementation Agreement under which
154
specific procedures for continuing disclosures are enunciated.
Initially, as the district court opinion in Smith v. United
States 155 illustrated, it appeared that the failure to comply strictly
with the agreed upon procedures would cause a disclosure to be
unauthorized under section 6301(d).1 56 As the liaison officer to
the IRS for the Illinois Department of Revenue (IDR) under the
Federal-State Exchange Program, Thomas Smith was responsible
for obtaining from the Service the returns and return information needed by the IDR to administer the Illinois tax laws. 1 57 In
mid-October, 1984, the District Director for the Springfield District of the IRS, Ira Loeb, became aware that Smith had been
delinquent in his federal tax obligations. Several weeks later,
Loeb received an internal memorandum indicating that Smith
had not filed federal returns for two years and owed back taxes
for two other years.' 5 8 Loeb believed that Smith's federal tax
problems compromised his position as liaison officer and decided
to inform Smith's superiors. 59 Loeb personally provided J.
Thomas Johnson, Director of the IDR, with the internal memorandum and requested that Smith be relieved of his duties as liai0
son officer. 16
150 Section 6103(p)(1) states that: "Requests for the inspection or disclosure of a
return or return information and such inspection or disclosure shall be made in
such manner and at such time and place as shall be prescribed by the Secretary."
Id. § 6 103 (p)(1).
151 Smith v. United States, 703 F. Supp. 1344, 1347 (C.D. 11. 1989), rev'd, 964
F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1992).
152 DISCLOSURE OF OFFICIAL INFORMATION HANDBOOK, reprinted in [1992] Part 1
Int. Rev. Man. (CCH) 2283-2300.

153
154
155
156
157
158

Id.
Id.
703 F. Supp. 1344 (C.D. Ill. 1989), rev'd, 964 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1348-50.
Id. at 1345.

Id.

159 Id. at 1345-46.

160 Id. at 1346.
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The district court asserted that the disclosure to Johnson of
the internal memorandum's return information violated section
6103(d). Central to the 1989 decision was Loeb's failure to follow the requirements specified in the Implementation Agreement between the IRS and the IDR.16 1 The district court stated
that although there was little doubt that Loeb would have received the written request for the information had he followed
the procedures, Loeb simply failed to follow the explicit procedures in his overzealousness to inform Johnson about Smith's
62
discrepancies. 1
In a 1992 decision, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court and determined that the Implementation Agreement did
not apply because it did not anticipate that a liaison officer would
be the subject of the disclosure. 163 The appellate court proclaimed that due to the Implementation Agreement's inapplicability, the Coordination Agreement came into play because "it
explicitly contemplates disclosure of the type of tax information
64
at issue here, and it trumps the Implementation Agreement."'
Because the Coordination Agreement authorized the direct disclosure of return information to the IDR Director, the Seventh
Circuit maintained that the disclosure in Smith was not
161 Id. at 1348-49. Described by the district court as "a rather cumbersome approach to the transmittal of return information," the IRS-IDR Implementation
Agreement dictates disclosure procedure. In order to disclose return information,
the IRS must, through its liaison officer, contact the IDR liaison officer and describe
the return information without disclosing identifying information so as to ascertain
the agency's need for and potential use of such information. Id. at 1348. If the IRS
liaison officer determines that the agency needs and possesses a use for the information, the officer then must provide the agency with identifying information. The
state agency may then make a specific request for the information. Id.
162 Id. at 1349. Code § 6103(d)(1) requires that any disclosure of return information be made only to the state agency's designated representative. Furthermore,
the Implementation Agreement specified the IDR liaison officer as the person with

whom the IRS was to deal. The Smith district court recognized that in § 6103, Con-

gress did not anticipate the liaison officer being the subject of the return information disclosure. The district court reasoned that because Smith was the designated
agent of Johnson and the subject of the disclosure, no violation of § 6103 would
have occurred had Loeb substituted Johnson for Smith in accordance with the specified procedures in the Implementation Agreement. Id. at 1347.
163 Smith v. United States, 964 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1992).
164 Id. at 634-35. See Long v. United States, 972 F.2d 1174 (10th Cir. 1992) (Coordination Agreement along with Implementation Agreement satisfied the written
request requirement of § 6103(d)); Baxtor v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 89-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9138 (D. Nev. 1988), aff'd, 899 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1990)
(Coordination Agreement constituted a standing written request for certain return
information).
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unauthorized. 1 6 5
In a context factually dissimilar from that of Smith, the Fifth
Circuit insisted on strict compliance with statutory requirements
before the disclosure of tax returns or return information in
Huckaby v. United States Dep't of Treasury.'66 This 1986 decision involved the IRS investigation of Don Huckaby, the president of
Good Times Liquor, Inc., for filing false returns.' 67 Martin, the
IRS agent assigned to the case, received bank account records
and liquor invoices from Huckaby, with the understanding that
pursuant to state law the liquor invoices would remain available
to the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC). 16 1 Subsequently, a TABC agent requested access to some of the invoices
in Martin's possession. After Huckaby gave Martin's name and
telephone number to the TABC agent, the agent called Martin
and Martin later delivered the invoices to another TABC
agent.' 6 9

The Huckaby court found that Martin made a disclosure of
return information when he provided the TABC agent with the
liquor invoices. 170 The court further surmised that the disclosure
was unauthorized, despite Huckaby's oral authorization.' 7 ' The

Fifth Circuit explained that authorization under section 6103(d)
would require a written request from the TABC and authorization under section 6103(c) clearly calls for the taxpayer's written
request or consent. 172 Because Huckaby orally authorized Martin's disclosure of the return information to17the TABC agent, section 6103 did not sanction the disclosure.
165 Id. In another case involving an IDR employee, the Seventh Circuit made
clear that § 6103(d) authorized disclosures pertaining to the employees of the state
taxing agency as long as those disclosures are to insure the integrity of the state
agency's administration of its tax laws. Rueckert v. IRS, 775 F.2d 208 (7th Cir.
1985). The issue to be decided was whether § 6103(d) authorized a disclosure for
the purpose of determining whether the state employee was violating the state
agency's ban on outside employment. In Rueckert, the IRS made the disclosure pursuant to a proper request by the state official.
166 794 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1986), reh'g granted on other grounds, 804 F.2d 297 (5th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085 (1986).
167 Id. at 1044.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.

at 1050.
Id.
Id. at 1046-47. Section 6103(c) authorizes the Treasury Secretary to disclose
tax returns or return information to any person or persons that the taxpayer
designates in consent to or a written request for such disclosure.
173 Huckaby, 794 F.2d at 1050.
'7'
172
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Other Disclosures
One of the principal factors in Congress's decision to make
tax returns and return information confidential was the potential
use of that information by the government for political or other
74
reasons unrelated to the imposition or collection of taxes.,
When faced with a disclosure that is the result of political or
other non-tax motives, the courts have had little difficulty finding
liability under section 7431.
For example, in McLarty v. United States,' 75 Joseph Gorman
and several other members of a commodity and barter association were charged in Minnesota with impairing and impeding the
IRS. 1 76 Gorman wanted to replace his retained local attorney
with Scott McLarty of Athens, Georgia. McLarty filed an application to appear pro hac vice as Gorman's attorney in United States v.
Gorman. 17 7 McLarty's application was denied due to his chemical
dependency, criminal convictions and actions before several
other courts.178 Although the reasons cited by the Gorman court
were sufficient to deny the pro hac vice application, the judge possessed other information that reflected on McLarty's character as
an officer of the court.
About the same time McLarty sought to enter the case, the
federal prosecutor assigned to the case, Donald Lewis, received a
teletype from the United States Attorney offices in New York requesting information about McLarty. Lewis contacted an Assistant U.S. Attorney in New York and asked that he send Lewis all
the information regarding McLarty that he possessed.'

79

Lewis

received a packet that included an IRS memorandum stating that
no federal tax returns for 1980 and 1981 were on file for Mc174 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) at 326-27.
175 741 F. Supp. 751 (D. Minn. 1990), reconsidered on issue of goodfaith defense, 784 F.

Supp. 1401 (D. Minn. 1991).
176 United States v. Stelten, 661 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Minn. 1987), aff'd, 867 F.2d
446 (8th Cir. 1989). Gorman and the others were found guilty. 867 F.2d at 447.
177 661 F. Supp. 1087 (D. Minn. 1987). See also United States v. Stelten, 867 F.2d
446 (8th Cir. 1989) (affirming Gorman's conviction for conspiring to defraud the
United States government).
178 Gorman, 661 F. Supp. at 1088-90. Included in the list of misdeeds offered to
support the denial of McLarty's application were two DUI convictions, three contempt of court convictions, one criminal trespass conviction, continuing chemical
substance abuse, unruly courtroom behavior and McLarty's failure to appear in the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota when he was the attorney
of record in another case. Id. at 1089-90.
179 McLarty, 741 F. Supp. at 753.
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Larty. Lewis sent the judge all the information in the packet. 80
Shortly before the hearing, Lewis instructed the IRS special
agent assisting him on the case to provide him with transcripts of
McLarty's tax accounts. At the hearing, the judge did not inquire about McLarty's tax situation. A few days after the hearing,
but before the decision was rendered, the judge asked the IRS
special agent whether McLarty had fulfilled his current federal
tax obligations. Contacted by the agent, Lewis responded to the
judge's inquiry by sending copies of McLarty's tax account transcripts to the judge.'
The Service contended that the disclosures of McLarty's return information by the special agent to Lewis, and by Lewis to
the judge, were authorized under sections 6103(h)(2) and (4).182
The court disagreed, holding that the exceptions under sections
6103(h)(2) and (4) pertained only to proceedings to which the
taxpayer was a party.' 8 3 The district court maintained that McLarty's status as a potential attorney for one of the defendants
did not make him a party in the underlying proceeding. 8 4 In180 Id.
181 Id.

182 Id. at 754. Code § 6103(h)(2) authorizes disclosure of returns or return information to officers and employees of the Department of Justice (including U.S. Attorneys) if they are personally and directly involved in any proceeding involving tax
administration before any federal grand jury or court, but only where the taxpayer
may be or is a party to the proceeding. I.R.C. § 6103(h)(2) (1992). Section
6103(h)(4) authorizes disclosures of tax returns and return information in any federal judicial proceeding pertaining to tax administration, but only if the taxpayer is
a party. I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4).
183 McLarty, 741 F. Supp. at 754-55. Another subsection of § 6103(h) has created
a split among several circuits. See I.R.C. § 6103(h)(5) (granting the government
and the taxpayer in civil and criminal tax cases the right to receive, after a proper
request, return information concerning prospective jurors). The authorized return
information is limited to whether the IRS has ever audited or investigated the potential juror. Id. In United States v. Sinigaglio, the Ninth Circuit held that absent a
timely receipt of the authorized return information concerning the prospective jurors, a failure to grant a continuance was reversible error that could not be cured by
eliciting the information from prospective jurors during voir dire. United States v.
Sinigaglio, 942 F.2d 581, 583 (9th Cir. 1991). Conversely, the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits have held that an elicitation during voir dire of return information authorized to be disclosed under § 6103(h)(5) transformed a denial of the taxpayer's motion for continuance, based upon a non-timely disclosure of the return information
under § 6103(h)(5), into harmless error. See United States v. Masat (Masat 1), 896
F.2d 88 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Masat (Masat II), 948 F.2d 923 (5th Cir.
1991), reh g denied, 952 F.2d 402 (1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 108 (1992); United
States v. Schandl, 947 F.2d 462 (11 th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2946 (1992).
184 McLarty, 741 F. Supp. at 754 (citations omitted). For an example of a proper
disclosure of return information under § 6103(h), see United States v. Bacheler,
611 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1979).
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deed, the McLarty court termed the disclosures "a prime example
of practices that the 1976 Tax Reform Act was meant to
curtail."'8
THE GOOD FAITH DEFENSE

Section 7431(b) provides that no liability arises with regard
to any disclosure resulting from an erroneous interpretation of
section 6103 made in good faith.' 8 6 The courts have labored in
attempting to determine when the good faith defense should be
available. The issue is far from settled.
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,'"7 the Supreme Court adopted an ob-

jective standard for determining if government officials performing discretionary duties should be immune from civil liability as a
result of actions that fall within the scope of their official duties.""' Under the objective standard adopted in the 1982 Harlow
decision, "qualified immunity would be defeated if an official
knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took
...would violate the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff], or if
he took the action with malicious intention to cause . . .injury
. ... 189 If the law is not clearly established, then the official

cannot reasonably be expected to predict whether or not his action will subsequently be assessed as unlawful.' 9°
Courts have divided on whether the good faith defense of
section 7431 should be tested under Harlow's objective standard.
The Eighth Circuit adopted the objective standard for qualified
immunity to the good faith defense under section 7217 (the
predecessor to section 7431) in Rorex v. Traynor. 9 ' Similarly, in
Diamond v. United States,'9 2 the Eighth Circuit deemed the objec-

tive standard to be the proper standard for the good faith defense under section 7431. The question under section 7431,
however, is whether the Service made a good faith but erroneous
interpretation of section 6103, because section 7431 authorizes
civil actions only against the United States rather than against
individual IRS agents, as was the case under section 7217.11
185 McLarty, 741 F. Supp. at 755.
186 I.R.C. § 7431(b) (1992).

187 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
188 Id. at 818.
189
190
191
192
193

Id. at 815, 818-19 (quoting Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)).
Id. at 818.
771 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1985).
944 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 435-36. The court did recognize that there may be situations where the
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The Fifth Circuit, in Huckaby v. United States Dep't of Treasury,' 94 declared the objective test of Harlow irrelevant to a section
7431 good faith defense because Congress shielded individual
agents from liability by providing that the United States alone
was liable for its agents' actions.' 9 5 The Huckaby court did find
Harlow instructive on the good faith defense issue, and held that
the test should be whether a reasonable IRS agent would be fainterpretamiliar with the Code and his own agency's statutory
19 6
tion as reflected in its manuals and regulations.
19 7
In William E. Schrambling Accountancy Corp. v. United States,
and Husby v. United States,' 9 8 district courts in California approved
of the Huckaby approach, although limiting it to good faith but
erroneous interpretations of section 6103. The Schrambling and
Husby courts asserted that the good faith defense in section 7431
does not comprise a general test of good faith.' 9 9 This section
does not apply in instances where the IRS has properly interpreted section 6103, but where an agent simply makes a good
faith mistake,20 0 or there has been a clerical error.2 0 '
Two North Carolina district courts have applied a subjective
test of the agent's good faith. In Flippo v. United States,20 2 the
court held that the good faith defense will be available if the
agent believed that section 6103 or some other provision of the
agent's interpretation may be the subject of the objective standard, such as when
the IRS has properly interpreted Code § 6103, but the agent errs in interpreting
the IRS determination. Id. at 435 n.7. See also McLarty v. United States, 741 F.
Supp. 751 (D. Minn. 1990) (McLarty I) (issued before the Diamond decision, and
holding both subjective and objective elements of good faith should be tested);
McLarty v. United States, 784 F. Supp. 1401 (D. Minn. 1991) (McLarty II) (issued
after the Diamond decision upon a motion for reconsideration). In McLarty II, the
district court held the test should be an objective one, but went beyond the holding
in Diamond (that the good faith to be tested is that of the agency) and objectively
tested the good faith of the individual officials involved. McLarty II, 784 F. Supp. at
1403-04.
194 794 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1986), reh 'g granted on other grounds, 804 F.2d 297 (5th

Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085 (1986).
195 Id. at 1048.

196 Id. See Marre v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,398 (S.D. Tex.
1992); Lebaron v. United States, 794 F. Supp. 947 (C.D. Cal. 1992); Smith v.
United States, 703 F. Supp. 1344 (C.D. Ill. 1989).
197 689 F. Supp. 1001 (N.D. Cal. 1988), rev'don othergrounds, 937 F.2d 1484 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 956 (1992).
198 672 F. Supp. 442 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
199 Schrambling, 689 F. Supp. at 1007; Husby, 672 F. Supp. at 445.
200 Schrambling, 689 F. Supp. at 1007.
201 Husby, 672 F. Supp. at 445.
202 670 F. Supp. 638 (W.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd mem., 849 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1988).
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Code authorized the disclosure.20 3 In Harrison v. United States,2 0 4
the court relied on the Flippo subjective test in affirming that liability under section 7431 will not attach if the agent believed in
good faith that section 6103 authorized his actions.20 5
DAMAGES

Section 7431 of the Code provides that, in addition to the
action's costs, the successful plaintiff may recover the greater of
liquidated damages in the amount of $1000 for each unauthorized disclosure or the sum of his actual damages and any punitive
damages .206
Costs and Attorney's Fees

Section 7431 allows recovery of the costs of the action.20 7
The term "costs" does not include attorney's fees. 0 8 To recover
attorney's fees in a section 7431 action, plaintiff must meet the

requirements of section 7430.29 Section 7430 requires a show203 Id. at 643.
204 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)

50,094 (M.D.N.C. 1990).
205 Id. at 83,334.
206 Section 7431(c) states that:
In any action brought under subsection (a), upon a finding of liability
on the part of the defendant, the defendant shall be liable to the
plaintiff in an amount equal to the sum of(1) the greater of(A) $1,000 for each act of unauthorized disclosure of a return or return information with respect to which such defendant
is found liable, or
(B) the sum of(i) the actual damages sustained by the plaintiff as a result of such unauthorized disclosure, plus
(ii) in the case of a willful disclosure or a disclosure
which is the result of gross negligence, punitive damages,
plus
(2) the costs of the action.
I.R.C. § 7431(c) (1992).
207 Id.
208 Smith v. United States, 735 F. Supp. 1396, 1399 (C.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 964 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1992).
209 Id.; see also McLarty v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,395 (D.
Minn. 1992); William E. Schrambling Accountancy Corp. v. United States, 589 F.
Supp. 1001, 1008 (N.D. Cal. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 937 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 956 (1992); see Huckaby v. United States Dep't of
Treasury, 804 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085
(1986); Marre v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,398 (S.D. Tex.
1992). The government continues to argue that § 7430 is inapplicable to § 7431
actions unless the underlying dispute was brought "in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax, interest, or penalty," as specified in § 7430.
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ing that the plaintiff was the prevailing party.2 1 To be found the
prevailing party, the taxpayer must prove two elements.2 1 ' First,
the taxpayer must demonstrate that the United States's position
was not substantially justified and, second, that the taxpayer substantially prevailed with regard to the most significant issue or,
alternatively, the amount in controversy.2 12 A position is not
substantially justified if it is not clearly reasonable or wellfounded in law and in fact.2 1 3 If the government has failed to
conduct an adequate investigation of its case, its position may not
be reasonable.2 1 4 In any event, the question is to be decided on a
21 5
case-by-case basis.
Regarding the second element of the taxpayer's burden, the
taxpayer must show only that the government violated section
Smith v. United States, 735 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (C.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 964 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1992). To date, this argument has not been successful, although, as pointed out in Smith, the argument is not meritless.
210 I.R.C. § 7430(a) (1992).
211 See Kenagy v. United States, 942 F.2d 459, 463 (8th Cir. 1991); McLarty, 92-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 7(CCH) 50,395 at 85,306; Smith, 735 F. Supp. at 1400.
212 I.R.C. § 430(c)(4) (1992). Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (October 22, 1986), the standard applied to the government's position was based upon concepts of reasonableness. I.R.C. § 7430(c)
(amended 1986). See George v. United States, 666 F. Supp. 962, 963 n.1 (E.D.
Mich. 1987) (stating that after the Code was amended, the standard applied to the
United States government had changed from "unreasonable" to "not substantially
justified"). The amended Code's language conforms to the "not substantially justified" standard from the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412
(1985). Accordingly, courts applying the "not substantially justified standard" of
Code § 7430 may look to EAJA cases. Kenagy v. United States, 942 F.2d 459, 464
(8th Cir. 1991).
The United States Supreme Court objectively interpreted the term "substantially justified" under the EAJA to mean justified to a degree that could satisfy a
reasonable person. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565-66 & n.2 (1988) (citations omitted). In a footnote, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, contradicted
the "suggestion" ofJustice Brennan's concurring opinion that the majority incorrectly transformed the EAJA term "substantially justified" into "reasonably justified." Id. at 566 n.2. Justice Scalia acknowledged that
Justice Brennan's arguments would have some force if the statutory
criterion were substantially correct rather than "substantially justified."
But a position can be justified even though it is not correct, and we
believe it can be substantially (i.e., for the most part) justified if a reasonable person could think it correct, that is, if it has a reasonable
basis in law and fact.
Id. The Court also considered objective criteria, including the stage at which the
litigation ended and views offered by other tribunals on the merits of the government's case. Id. at 568-69.
213 Kenagy, 942 F.2d at 464 (citing United States v. Estridge, 797 F.2d 1454, 1459
(8th Cir. 1986)).
214 Id.
215 Id. (citing In re Arthur Andersen & Co., 832 F.2d 1057, 1060 (8th Cir. 1987)).
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6103 in order to prevail with respect to the most significant issue
in a section 7431 action.21 6 Damage awards that are nominal in
nature, or substantially less than the amount sought by the taxpayer, are irrelevant if the taxpayer prevails with respect to the
most significant issue.2 17
Liquidated Damages
Section 7431 instructs that the defendant is liable to the
plaintiff for $1000 "for each act of unauthorized disclosure
.. .. 218 The only issue that a court must address in awarding
liquidated damages is what constitutes an "act" of unauthorized
disclosure. Courts' analyses of this phrase have yielded results
that blanket the interpretative spectrum. For example, the district court in Mid-South Music awarded $1000 for each copy of a
letter sent by the IRS to 174 taxpayers, although the court did
not inquire as to whether the taxpayers actually read the letter or
if more than one person read each copy of the letter.21 9 In Johnson v. Sawyer,2 20 however, the district court concluded that "each
instance" of unauthorized disclosure should not mean the
number of press releases drafted by the IRS (one inJohnson), nor
the number of persons actually reading the press release 22 1 (no
evidence offered), but rather the number of media outlets that
received the press release. Moreover, courts have held that one
document or disclosure containing more than one year's worth of
return information constitutes only one disclosure,2 2 while one
216 Huckaby v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 804 F.2d 297, 300 (5th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085 (1986); Marre v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 50,398 (S.D. Tex. 1991); McLarty v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 50,395 (D. Minn. 1992); Smith v. United States, 734 F. Supp. 1396, 1400
(C.D. Il1. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 964 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1992).
217 Huckaby, 804 F.2d at 299-300; Marre, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,318; Smith, 735
F. Supp. at 1400.
218 I.R.C. § 7431(c)(1)(A) (1992).
219 Mid-South Music Corp. v. United States, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9782, at
90,154 (M.D. Tenn. 1985).
220 640 F. Supp. 1126, 1136 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
221 Id. In Rorex v. Traynor, 771 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1985), the Eighth Circuit
made a similar award, but failed to justify the award's calculation. The Johnson court
interpreted the liquidated damages clause of Code § 7217, the predecessor of
§ 7431. Although the two sections are not identical (§ 7217 calls for $1000 in damages for "each instance" of unauthorized disclosure, whereas § 7431(c) mandates
$1000 in damages for "each act" of unauthorized disclosure), courts have interpreted the two sections consistently.
222 See Rorex, 771 F.2d at 388; Marre v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,398 at 85,317 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Smith v. United States, 730 F. Supp. 948, 954
(C.D. Ill. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 964 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1992).
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document containing return information addressed to two persons comprises two disclosures.223

In Schrambling,2 2 4 the court disagreed with the government's
argument that the acts of unauthorized disclosure should be limited to those copies of the return information the plaintiff could
prove were received by someone. The court responded that the
proper measure should be the number of copies of the return
information mailed.225 In Marre v. United States,2 2 6 the district
court announced that once a third party is aware of the return
information, a subsequent disclosure does not constitute a separate violation.227 As a result, even though return information
may have been disclosed to a party five different times, only the
first disclosure is relevant to the damages consideration.
Actual Damages
Instead of the liquidated damages amount of $1000 for each
unauthorized disclosure, the plaintiff taxpayer can recover the
sum of his actual damages and any punitive damages, if such sum
is greater than the liquidated damages amount. 228 No reported
case has granted or upheld on appeal an actual damage award. It
appears that two factors have contributed to the lack of actual
damage awards. First, the Code does not define "actual damages.

' 22 9

This lack of a statutory definition has caused some con-

fusion about what kind of losses are compensable. For example,
in reversing an actual damage award for emotional suffering, the
Eighth Circuit has charged that "hurt feelings alone" do not constitute actual damages under section 743 1.230 In that case, the
government argued that nonquantifiable losses such as damaged
reputation and generalized mental injuries are not covered and
only pecuniary losses are compensable under section 743 1.23,
223 Mallas v. United States, 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,376 at 85,225
(M.D.N.C. 1992).
224 689 F. Supp. 1001 (N.D. Cal. 1988), rev'don other grounds, 937 F.2d 1485 (9th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 956 (1992).
225 Id. at 1008.
226 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,398 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
227 Id. at 85,317. The liquidated damages provision of § 7431 has produced
damage awards as low as $1000, Chandler v. United States, 687 F. Supp. 1515 (D.
Utah 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d 1357 (10th Cir. 1989), and as high as $215,000, Marre,
92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 85,318.
228 I.R.C. § 7431(c) (1992).
229 See supra notes 36, 206.
230 Rorex v. Traynor, 771 F.2d 383, 387-88 (8th Cir. 1985).
231 Id. The court did not reach the question of whether only pecuniary losses are
compensable: "The only evidence of injury resulting from the disclosure in this
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The other factor contributing to the lack of actual damage
awards is the scarcity of evidence offered by taxpayers at trial as
to their injuries and losses. Courts seem to recognize the potential for actual damage awards, but are forced to rely on the liquidated damage provision of section 7431 due to a lack of proof
23 2
concerning actual damages. The court in Marre v. United States
admitted that it was "stymied" by the lack of evidence concerning
actual damages.2 33
Normal tenets of tort law also prevent some actual damage
awards. In Smith v. United States,234 the court held that a section
6103 violation, in the improper disclosure to the taxpayer's employer of the taxpayer's failure to file tax returns for several
years, was not the proximate cause of the taxpayer's termination
by the employer.235 The court reasoned that had the disclosure
been made in the proper manner, the taxpayer still would have
been terminated.2 36
There is no reason, however, that substantial damages could
not be awarded under section 7431. Two cases relating the ex237
periences of Elvis E. Johnson with the IRS serve as examples.
Johnson was a high-ranking officer of the American National Life
Insurance Company of Galveston, Texas, and, by the mid 1970s,
was in line to become the next CEO and Chairman of the Board.
During the late 1970s, the IRS began an investigation into Johnson's 1974 and 1975 tax returns and decided to file criminal
charges against him for tax evasion. 23 8 Although Johnson be-

lieved that he was not guilty of tax evasion, he agreed to a plea
bargain for two reasons. First, although several of the other
American National officers were aware of Johnson's IRS difficulties, Johnson wanted to avoid a publicized scandal. Second,
Johnson's wife had been primarily responsible for keeping his expense records, and he wanted to spare her the embarrassment of
case was the taxpayer's testimony that they suffered personal embarrassment. We
do not think that hurt feelings alone constitute actual damages compensable under
the statute." Id.
232 92-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,398 (S.D. Tex. 1992).
233 Id. at 85,317. A lack of evidence concerning actual damages also appeared to
handcuff the Rorex court, despite the court's mentioning some possible injuries,
such as harm to the taxpayers' reputation or credit rating. Rorex, 771 F.2d at 387.
234 730 F. Supp. 948 (C.D. Ill.
1990), rev'd on other grounds, 964 F.2d 630 (7th Cir.
1992).
235 Id. at 954.
236 Id. at 952-54.
237 Johnson v. Sawyer, 760 F. Supp. 1216 (S.D. Tex. 1991); Johnson v. Sawyer,
640 F. Supp. 1126 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
238 Johnson, 760 F. Supp. at 1221.
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a criminal prosecution.2 "9
In exchange for Johnson's plea, the Assistant United States
Attorney agreed to several stipulations to minimize the publicity
of the action. One such stipulation was that there would be no
press release following the proceedings. The judge accepted the
stipulations, and Johnson pleaded guilty and received
probation.240
Soon thereafter, the IRS issued a press release without
either an inspection of the court documents relating to the case
or coordination with the U.S. Attorney's office.2 4 ' Moreover, the
press release contained factually inaccurate information 24 2 and
information that was not a part of the public record.243
Within a few days, Johnson was forced to resign from his
position in Galveston. He subsequently sold his house there, and
returned to Springfield, Missouri, working in a subordinate role
for American National. Because he was no longer an executive,
Johnson was forced to retire at the age of sixty-five as opposed to
the mandatory retirement age of seventy for executives.2 4 4
Johnson sued the individual agents responsible for the press
release under section 7217, the predecessor of section 743 1,245
and received $21,000 in liquidated damages.24 6 Johnson then
successfully sued the agents and the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act 247 for the negligent issuance of an unau-

thorized press release containing confidential information not in
the public record 248 and the negligent supervision of IRS employees. 24 9 Johnson was awarded $10,902,117.250 There is no
question that the quantifiable components of Johnson's award
Id.
Id. at 1222.
Id. at 1224.
Id. at 1222. The release stated that Johnson had pled guilty to tax evasion for
1974 and 1975, when, in fact, the guilty plea related only to 1975. Id.
243 Id. The release gave Johnson's full name, Elvis E. Johnson, while court
records identified him only as Elvis Johnson. The release also listed Johnson's
home address and age, identified him as an officer of American National, and suggested that he had confessed to falsifying deductions and altering documents.
None of this information was part of the court record. Id.
244 Id. at 1223 & n.4.
245 Under prior law, the individual who made an unauthorized disclosure, rather
than the United States, was the defendant. I.R.C. § 7217, repealedby Pub. L. No. 97248, 96 Stat. 645. See I.R.C. § 7431 (1992) (repealing former § 7217).
246 Johnson v. Sawyer, 640 F. Supp. 1126, 1136 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
247 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1988).
248 Johnson v. Sawyer, 760 F. Supp. 1216, 1230 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
249 Id. at 1231-32.
250 Id. at 1233. The components of the damages were as follows:
239
240
241
242
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would be obtainable under section 7431, but there has been
some suggestion by the courts that nonquantifiable losses, such
as the $5,000,000 that Johnson received for the loss of his position and other employment benefits, emotional distress and
mental anguish, are not compensable.25 '
Punitive Damages
In the case of an unauthorized disclosure resulting from
grossly negligent or willful actions, section 7431 provides for an
award of punitive damages2 52 where such damages, coupled with
the plaintiff's actual damages, exceed the amount of liquidated
damages due the plaintiff. Punitive damages have been awarded
only rarely, and two such awards were invalidated on appeal. A
jury awarded two taxpayers $7500 each in punitive damages resulting from a disclosure of their tax return information to a bank
even though the taxpayers were current on an installment agreement. 53 The Eighth Circuit dismissed the award, holding that
Loss of earnings
Loss of pension benefits
Loss of deferred compensation
Loss of sale of Galveston house
Loss of position and other
employment benefits, emotional
distress and mental anguish

$3,675,917
1,524,492
664,208
37,500
5,000,000

Id.
251 See Rorex v. Traynor, 771 F.2d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 1985). The Rorex court
made no determination that such injuries are non-compensable, but speculated
that the government's contention they are not may be correct. The government
based its position on Fitzpatrick v. United States, 665 F.2d 327, 331 (11 th Cir.
1982), a Privacy Act case that held that only pecuniary losses were recoverable. A
later Fifth Circuit case held that actual damages under the Privacy Act included
damages for not only out-of-pocket costs, but also for physical and mental injuries
for which there was competent evidence in the record. Johnson v. IRS, 700 F.2d
971, 972 (5th Cir. 1983). Although the Privacy Act provision for damages is similar
to that of § 7431, the sections are not identical, and the question of whether nonquantifiable losses such as general mental injuries and loss of reputation, are compensable under § 7431 has never been decided. A good argument can be made
that actual damages, as used in Code § 7431 (c), does include other than pecuniary
losses, because both § 7432 (civil damages for failure to release lien) and § 7433
(civil damages for certain unauthorized collection actions) call for "actual, direct
economic damages sustained by the plaintiff." I.R.C. §§ 7432(b)(1), 7433(b)(1)
(1992). In addition, regulations under both sections further define "actual, direct
economic damages" as actual pecuniary damages sustained by the taxpayer. Injuries such as inconvenience, emotional distress and loss of reputation are compensable only if they result in pecuniary loss. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7432-1(c)(1),
301.7433-1(b)(1) (1992). No regulations have been issued under Code § 7431.
252 I.R.C. § 7431(c) (1992).
253 Rorex v. Traynor, 771 F.2d 383, 385 (8th Cir. 1985).
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while the agent may have been negligent in his actions, the evidence did not demonstrate that he acted willfully or with gross
negligence.254 Similarly, a Tennessee district court awarded a
taxpayer $1000 in punitive damages for the willful or grossly
negligent disclosure of the taxpayer's return information to investors in a pass-through entity in violation of section 6103.255
The Sixth Circuit subsequently negated the award in reversing
the district court on the issue of liability.256
Conversely, in Malis v. United States,257 the court proclaimed a
$4000 punitive damage award for the taxpayer Malis, whose return information was orally disclosed by an IRS agent to a neighbor and a stenographer. 258 The abundant evidence of willful or
grossly negligent conduct included the agent's statements that
25 9
Malis was going to jail and that he was "going to get" Malis.

A lack of evidence of the defendant's willful or grossly negligent action comprises a major bar to punitive damage awards.260
In what could potentially be another bar to punitive damage
awards, a few courts have construed section 7431 (c) to allow punitive damages only when actual damages have been awarded.
The district court in Smith v. United States 26 ' first posited this construction. The Smith court reasoned that because the Code
"clearly provides" that the taxpayer "is entitled to the greater of
$1000 for each act of unauthorized disclosure or the sum of his
actual damages plus, in the case of willful disclosure, punitive
damages, ' ' 2 6 2 no punitive damages are available where the taxpayer has not suffered actual damages. 263 A California district
court read section 743 1(c) in a similar manner.264 Neither court
offered any authority in support of their interpretations of secId. at 388.
Mid-South Music Corp. v. United States, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9782
(M.D. Tenn. 1985).
256 Mid-South Music Corp. v. United States (Mid-South I1), 818 F.2d 536 (6th Cir.
1987).
257 87-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9212 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
258 Id. at 87,350.
254
255

259 Id.
260 See

Huckaby v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 794 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir.
1986); Chandler v.United States, 687 F. Supp. 1515 (D. Utah 1988), aff'd, 887 F.2d
1397 (10th Cir. 1989); Heller v. Plave, 657 F. Supp. 95 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
261 730 F. Supp. 948 (C.D. Ill.
1990), revdon other grounds, 964 F.2d 630 (7th Cir.
1992).
262 Id. at 954-55. The district court stated that "the clear language of the statute
provides that when a taxpayer only recovers statutory damages, punitive damages
are unavailable to him." Id. at 955.
263 Id.
264 See William E. Schrambling Accountancy Corp. v. United States, 689 F. Supp.
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tion 7431 (c). The Smith district court went so far as to dismiss as
unjustifiable the precedent of granting punitive damages without
actual damages in the Malis and Mid-South Music cases.2 6 5
CONCLUSION

Over fifteen years have passed since tax returns and return
information became confidential and subject to disclosure only
when authorized under the provisions of section 6103. With a
few exceptions, sections 6103 and 7431 have been effective. The
exceptions are related to the courts' inability to resolve uniformly
a number of important issues concerning the two sections.
Whether return information remains subject to the provisions of section 6103 once it has become part of a public record
is an issue that requires resolution. As suggested by the Husby
court, it may not be good policy to force a taxpayer to choose
between the protections
of section 6103 and the ability to litigate
26 6
an issue in court.
The effect of an erroneous disclosure of return information
must be clarified as well, especially when the erroneous disclosure is in the form of a tax lien or a levy issued to the taxpayer's
employer, financial institution or customers. An improper levy
or lien can inflict serious damage to a taxpayer's credit rating or
reputation.267

The good faith defense under section 7431 has proven to be
an especially troublesome area for the courts. It must be determined whether the proper test is an objective test of the agent's
actions, 2

68

an objective test of the Service's actions2 69 or a subjec-

1001 (N.D. Cal. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 937 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.

denied, 112 S. Ct. 956 (1992).
265 Smith, 730 F. Supp. at 955.
266 See Husby v. United States, 672 F. Supp. 442, 444 (N.D. Cal. 1987).

267 Information concerning tax liens and levies can remain in a person's credit
report for up to seven years. MARK SKOUSEN, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO FINANCIAL
PRIVACY 166 (1983). Credit reporting agencies obtain their information from a variety of sources, such as county recorders, creditors and fiduciaries holding assets
of the person being investigated. Id. at 164-66. For additional information on how
credit reporting agencies obtain information, see WILLIAM PETROCELLI, Low PROFILE: How To AVOID THE PRIVACY INVADERS 42-63 (1981) and JAMES B. RULE, PRIVATE LIVES AND PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE: SOCIAL CONTROL IN THE COMPUTER AGE 175-

233 (1974).
268 See Huckaby v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 794 F.2d 1041, 1048 (5th Cir.
1986) reh'ggrantedon other grounds, 804 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 475 U.S.

1085 (1986).
269 See Diamond v. United States, 944 F.2d 431, 435-36 (8th Cir. 1991); William
E. Schrambling Accountancy Corp. v. United States, 689 F. Supp. 1001, 1007 (N.D.
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tive test of the agent's actions. 7 0 Two issues relating to damages
under section 7431 also call for clarification: whether actual damages include non-pecuniary injuries 27 I and whether punitive
damage awards are predicated upon an actual damage award. 72
Because courts have not been able to provide uniform interpretations of sections 6103 and 7431 concerning the above issues, it may be time for Congress to revisit the two sections with
a goal of providing uniformity. If Congress does reconsider sections 6103 and 7431, two other questions should be addressed.
First, Congress should consider increasing and indexing the liquidated damages award of $1000. Inflation since 1977 has diminished the economic value of the liquidated damages
provision. By increasing the statutory amount to the current-day
value of $1000 and indexing the figure to mitigate any future inflation, a taxpayer whose return information was disclosed in violation of section 6103 would be eligible for the same measure of
compensation, regardless of when the unauthorized disclosure
occurred.
Congress should also consider awarding attorney's fees to all
taxpayers who succeed in a section 7431 action. Such an award
would allow all taxpayers to defend aggressively the confidential
stature of their tax returns and return information. As many of
the cases discussed in this Article illustrate, a section 7431 action
can be a long and expensive trip through the federal court system. The government is able to marshall all of its legal resources
to defend against a section 7431 action, while most taxpayers
cannot afford to prosecute a section 6103 violation if the potential payback for success could be as little as $1000 plus costs.
When considering the amendment of section 6103 in 1976,
Congress recognized that the IRS may possess more information
about more people than any other agency in the United States.27
The congressional action suggested above would increase the efCal. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 937 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 956 (1992); Husby v. United States, 672 F. Supp. 442, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
270 See Flippo v. United States, 670 F. Supp. 638, 643 (W.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd
mere., 849 F.2d 604 (4th Cir. 1988); Harrison v. United States, 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 50,094 at 83,334 (M.D.N.C. 1990).
271 Rorex v. Traynor, 771 F.2d 383, 387-88 (8th Cir. 1985).
272 Smith v. United States, 730 F. Supp. 948,954-55 (C.D. Il1. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 964 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1992); William E. Schrambling Accountancy Corp.
v. United States, 689 F. Supp. 1001 (N.D. Cal. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 937 F.2d
1485 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 956 (1992).
273 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INT. REV. TAX., 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF

1976, 1976-3 C.B. (Vol. 2) at 314.
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fectiveness of sections 6103 and 7431 by clearly limiting access to
this vast informational source to situations where the need for
disclosure of the information outweighs the citizen's right to privacy. By clarifying the Code's more nebulous areas, Congress
could define for government officials the situations where disclosure of tax returns and return information is permitted. Taxpayers would also be better able to determine when a section 6103
violation has occurred. By increasing the liquidated damages
provision and allowing attorney's fees to all taxpayers who win
section 7431 actions, Congress could also insure that all taxpayers possess the means to effectuate the confidentiality of their tax
returns and return information.

